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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Olaf Hanson appeals from re-entry of judgment for unlawful possession of
a firearm, possession of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, providing
false information to a law enforcement officer, and driving while suspended.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Officer Smith stopped Hanson’s car for having a broken taillight and
expired registration. (P.H. Tr., p. 4, L. 13 – p. 5, L. 12.) Before and after the
vehicle stopped, Hanson reached down between and behind the seats for a
significant period. (P.H. Tr., p. 5, L. 13 – p. 6, L. 14.) When asked what he was
doing reaching down and behind the seats, Hanson initially claimed he was doing
nothing, then claimed he was “playing with his keys,” and then claimed he was
“playing with a cell phone.”

(P.H. Tr., p. 7, Ls. 3-11.)

Officer Smith asked

Hanson to step from the vehicle and secured his consent to conduct a pat-down
for weapons. (P.H. Tr., p. 7, Ls. 12-23.) After asking questions about ownership
of the car and asking for license and paperwork, Officer Smith returned to what
Hanson had been doing when reaching down between and behind the seats.
(P.H. Tr., p. 7, L. 24 – p. 9, L. 13.) Officer Smith thereafter asked Hanson for
consent to search the car, which Hanson granted. (P.H. Tr., p. 9, Ls. 14-22.)
Officer Smith found marijuana in the area where Hanson had been reaching.
(P.H. Tr., p. 9, L. 23 – p. 10, L. 11.) Officers also found a gun in a bag behind the
driver’s seat. (P.H. Tr., p. 11, Ls. 17-23; p. 13, Ls. 16-19; p. 15, Ls. 1-23.)
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The state charged Hanson with unlawful possession of a firearm,
possession of marijuana (less than three ounces), possession of drug
paraphernalia, providing false information to a law enforcement officer, and
driving while suspended, with a persistent violator enhancement. (R., pp. 60-62.)
He moved to suppress the evidence against him. (R., pp. 72-75.)
The district court concluded that the facts relevant to the suppression
motion were that about three minutes after Hanson exited the car and Officer
Smith frisked him, Officer Smith asked, “What’s under the seat? I’m gonna go
look,” to which Hanson replied that it was his cell phone. (01/03/07 Tr., p. 13,
L. 25 – p. 14, L. 10.) The conversation then went in a different direction for three
minutes as the officer explained the reasons for the stop.

(01/03/07 Tr., p. 13,

Ls. 10-18.) Then Officer Smith asked for permission to search the car. (01/03/07
Tr., p. 13, Ls. 19-21.) Hanson initially responded that the car was not his, but
after the officer explained that he was asking him because he was the driver,
Hanson granted consent. (01/03/07 Tr., p. 14, L. 21 – p. 15, L. 5.) The district
court denied the motion to suppress, finding under the totality of the
circumstances that Hanson voluntarily consented to a search of the car. (R.,
pp. 89-90; 01/03/07 Tr., p. 25, L. 14 – p. 34, L. 3.)
Hanson pled guilty to providing false information and driving while
suspended. (R., p. 95.) A jury found him guilty of unlawful possession of a
firearm, possession of marijuana, and possession of drug paraphernalia. (R.,
pp. 181-82.) After Hanson waived the jury and stipulated to a court trial on Part II
of the information, the district court found him to be a persistent violator. (R.,
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pp. 110-18.) The district court imposed a sentence of eight and one-half years
with two and one-half years determinate on the sole felony conviction and
retained jurisdiction, entering judgment on January 22, 2008. (R., pp. 231-38.)
On the misdemeanors the district court imposed sentences of 180 days with 180
days credit for time served for driving without privileges, 180 days with 180 days
credit for time served for possession of drug paraphernalia, 365 days with 365
days credit for time served for providing false information, and 365 days with 365
days credit for time served for possession of marijuana.

(R., pp. 235-38.)

Hanson filed an appeal, but the appeal (docket number 34991) was dismissed.
(R., pp. 242-57, 274.)
On June 12, 2008, the district court exercised its retained jurisdiction and
placed Hanson on probation. (R., pp. 258-59, 267-72.) Hanson filed a notice of
appeal from the judgment placing him on probation. (R., pp. 260-61.)

This

appeal (docket number 35447) was also dismissed. (R., pp. 275, 324, 331, 333,
365.)
While the appeal in docket 35447 was pending, probation violation
proceedings were initiated against Hanson. (R., pp. 276-79, 290-93, 307-09.)
The district court found Hanson in violation of his probation and, in a judgment
entered either January 14 or 15, 2009, reduced the determinate portion of the
sentence to one and one-half years, and executed the sentence. (R., pp. 32122, 361-63.)
Hanson filed for post-conviction relief in 2012. (See, e.g., R., p. 419.) The
parties stipulated that Hanson “be allowed to pursue his appeal” from the
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judgment filed on June 12, 2008, placing him on probation during the retained
jurisdiction. (R., pp. 419-28.) The district court initially reentered the amended
judgment on the probation violation, originally filed on December 1, 2009 (R.,
pp. 442-45), and then reentered the January 22, 2008 judgment (R., pp. 460671). Hanson appealed from the reentered judgment. (R., pp. 469-80.)

Even though the district court never reentered the judgment as stipulated to by
the parties, any error associated with this action is moot. Under the Appellate
Rules as they existed upon filing the June 13, 2008 notice of appeal, the
retention of jurisdiction tolled the time for filing the appeal. I.A.R. 14(a) (2007).
Thus, an appeal from the judgment entered at the end of the retained jurisdiction
period conferred jurisdiction on this Court for all matters decided before the entry
of the first judgment. However, because the judgments entered on the
misdemeanors are not within the scope of such tolling (because jurisdiction was
not retained in relation to them) and because the judgments on the
misdemeanors were not reentered or, on this record, the subject of postconviction relief, only the judgment on the felony for unlawful possession of a
firearm is subject to this appeal.
1
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ISSUE
Hanson states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Hanson’s motion to
suppress?
(Appellant’s brief, p. 6.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Hanson failed to show error in the district court’s finding that Hanson
voluntarily consented to the search of his car?
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ARGUMENT
Hanson Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court’s Finding That Hanson
Voluntarily Consented To The Search Of His Car
A.

Introduction
The district court found, under the totality of the circumstances, that

Hanson granted voluntary consent to search his car. (01/03/07 Tr., p. 25, L. 14 –
p. 32, L. 11.) As to Officer Smith’s statement, “I’m gonna look,” the district court
determined that, in the context of the video of the encounter, the statement was
not a claim of legal authority to search Hanson’s car and did not, under the
totality of the circumstances, render Hanson’s consent involuntary.

(Id.)

Hanson challenges this finding, asserting that his consent to search was a mere
acquiescence in Officer Smith’s stated authority to search regardless of consent.
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 8-19.) Application of the correct legal standards shows that
Hanson has failed to show clear error in the district court’s factual findings.
B.

Standard Of Review
“[W]hether a consent to a search was voluntary is a question of fact, and

our standard of review requires that we accept a trial court’s factual findings
unless they are clearly erroneous.” State v. Jaborra, 143 Idaho 94, 97, 137 P.3d
481, 484 (Ct. App. 2006). “In a suppression hearing where voluntariness is an
issue, the power to assess the credibility of the witnesses, resolve any conflicts in
the testimony, weigh the evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the
trial court.” State v. Ballou, 145 Idaho 840, 846, 186 P.3d 696, 702 (Ct. App.
2008).
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C.

Hanson Has Failed To Show Clear Error In The District Court’s Factual
Finding That He Voluntarily Consented To The Search Of His Car
“The voluntariness of a consent to search must be determined from the

totality of the circumstances.” State v. Thorpe, 141 Idaho 151, 153, 106 P.3d
477, 479 (Ct. App. 2004). “The State’s burden to show that consent was freely
and voluntarily given cannot be met by ‘showing no more than acquiescence to a
claim of lawful authority.’” State v. Tietsort, 145 Idaho 112, 118, 175 P.3d 801,
807 (Ct. App. 2007) (quoting Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 550
(1968)). An officer’s “false, erroneous or baseless representation” of the ability to
conduct a search without consent “weighs against a finding of voluntariness.”
Tietsort, 145 Idaho at 118–19, 175 P.3d at 807–08. However, voluntariness “is
not impaired simply because one is faced with two unpleasant choices” such as
“choosing between consenting to the search and allowing [contraband] to be
discovered and not consenting and risking arrest” or “consenting to a search or
having his premises searched pursuant to a warrant.” State v. Garcia, 143 Idaho
774, 779, 152 P.3d 645, 650 (Ct. App. 2006).
The district court determined that Officer Smith, in the context of
questioning Hanson about what he was fidgeting with between or behind the
seats asked, “What’s under the seat, you might as well tell me, I’m gonna look.”
(01/03/07 Tr., p. 13, L. 25 – p. 14, L. 7; p. 26, Ls. 16-22.) Hanson responded that
it was his cell phone. (01/03/07 Tr., p. 14, Ls. 7-10.) The conversation then went
“off on a tangent” that included an explanation for the traffic stop for about three
minutes. (01/03/07 Tr., p. 14, Ls. 10-20.) After that Officer Smith asked for, and
got, permission to search. (01/03/07 Tr., p. 14, L. 19 – p. 15, L. 20.) The district
7

court stated that, “in [its] view of the tape” of the encounter, the statement about
looking was not a “false and erroneous statement” because “in this particular
circumstance” the statement might have merely referred to looking at what was in
plain view and was “not the same as the officer actually saying” that he was
going to search the car. (01/03/07 Tr., p. 26, L. 15 – p. 27, L. 23.) In the totality
of the circumstances, the comment was not “unnecessarily coercive.”
Tr., p. 27, L. 23 – p. 28, L. 7.)

(01/03/07

Having found, under the totality of the

circumstances, that the statement “I’m gonna look” was not a declaration of legal
ability to search the car regardless of whether Hanson granted permission, and
was therefore not coercive, the district court did not err in finding no violation of
Hanson’s rights.
Hanson argues the district court erred because he merely acquiesced to
the officer’s claim of lawful authority, either because the officer’s statement was
an erroneous claim of lawful authority to search the car or because a “reasonable
person” would have understood it to be such. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 8-19.) The
flaw in this argument is that voluntariness of consent is a factual question that will
not be reversed absent a showing of clear error.
137 P.3d at 484.

Jaborra, 143 Idaho at 97,

Moreover, Hanson has failed to cite any authority that a

“reasonable person” standard applies instead of the totality of the circumstances.
City of Meridian v. Petra Inc., 154 Idaho 425, 450, 299 P.3d 232, 257 (2013)
(“We will not consider issues cited on appeal that are not supported by

8

propositions of law, authority or argument.” (internal quotations omitted)).2
Hanson does not claim clear error, and therefore his argument fails.
Even if Hanson’s argument could be considered as claiming clear error, it
would fail.

“Where an incomplete record is presented to an appellate court,

missing portions of the record are presumed to support the action of the trial
court.” Peasley Transfer & Storage Co. v. Smith, 132 Idaho 732, 744, 979 P.2d
605, 617 (1999).

The district court’s findings were based primarily on a

videotape of the encounter which was admitted as an exhibit. (01/03/07 Tr.,
p. 13, L. 25 – p. 16, L. 3; p. 26, L. 15 – p. 29, L. 8.) Hanson acknowledges, and
does not challenge, the district court’s conclusion that the exhibits were
destroyed by the court clerk in compliance with I.C.A.R. 38 because Hanson
failed to exercise diligence to preserve them. (Appellant’s brief, p. 5.) Hanson
cannot show clear error in factual findings derived from exhibits that are not part
of the record.
The state is aware of situations in the consent context where the reasonable
person standard applies to the officer, apparently under the general theory that
an unreasonable belief by the officer, even if sincerely held, will not justify an
otherwise unreasonable search or a seizure. See, e.g., State v. Fancher,
145 Idaho 832, 839, 186 P.3d 688, 695 (Ct. App. 2008) (“Law enforcement
officers may not simply accept a person’s invitation to enter premises if the
surrounding circumstances are such that a reasonable person would doubt that
person’s authority to consent and not act without further inquiry.” (internal quotes,
brackets and ellipses omitted)); State v. Ballou, 145 Idaho 840, 849, 186 P.3d
696, 705 (Ct. App. 2008) (“The standard for measuring the scope of consent
under the Fourth Amendment is that of objective reasonableness—what would
the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the
officer and the suspect.” (internal quotations omitted)). Hanson cites to cases
interpreting the scope of consent under the “reasonable person” standard
(Appellant’s brief, p. 18) without analysis or authority of how such a standard
would supplement or supplant the totality of the circumstances standard.
2
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The district court found that the officer did not make a show of authority to
which Hanson merely acquiesced.

Rather, under the totality of the

circumstances Hanson voluntarily consented to a search of the car. Hanson has
failed to show that the district court’s findings were clearly erroneous. As such,
Hanson has failed to show error by the district court.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s
judgment.
DATED this 3rd day of August, 2017.

_/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen___________
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 3rd day of August, 2017, served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing an
electronic copy to:
JENNY C. SWINFORD
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

KKJ/dd

_/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen___________
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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